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Wireless Sensor Network
• Wireless networks consisting of a large number of motes
– Self-organizing
– Highly integrated with changing environment and network
– Highly constrained resources
• processing, storage, bandwidth, power
• Facilitate large scale deployment
– Health care monitoring
– Surveillance
– Traffic monitoring
– Military applications
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WSN!!
MICA2 Mote
• ATmega128L 8-bit processor at 8 MHz
• 128KB program memory (flash)
• 512KB additional data flash memory
• 433, 868/916, or 310 MHz multi-channel 
radio transceiver
• 38.4 kbps radio, 500-1000 feet outdoor 
range (depending on versions) with a 
size of only 58 x 32 x 7 (mm)
• Usually it is run by TinyOS operating 
system and powered by 2 AA sized 
batteries
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An Application
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WSN Security Angles
• Viewing Angle 1
– (a) Key Management
– (b) Secure Routing     
– (c) Secure Services
– (d) Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) [outsider, insider]
• Viewing Angle 2
– (a) Physical security
– (b) Deployment security (sparse or dense, etc.)   
– (c) Topological security (cluster/flat, hierarchy/tree, etc.)
– (d) Wireless communication security
– (e) Data security
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WSN Security Angles
• Viewing Angle 3: Holistic Security
– (a) Application layer security
– (b) Transport layer security
– (c) Network layer security
– (d) Data link layer security
– (e) Physical layer security
• Holistic Security? – Still open research issue!
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DoS and DoS Attack
• Any kind of attempt of an adversary to disrupt, subvert, 
or destroy the network is a Denial of Service (DoS) 
attack
• In reality, any kind of incident that diminishes, eliminates, 
or hinders the normal activities of the network can cause 
a DoS situation 
• Some examples include 
– Hardware failures
– Software bugs
– Resource exhaustion
– Environmental conditions, or any type of complicated interaction 
of these factors
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DoS and DoS Attack
• DoS (Denial of Service) is basically a given formal name 
of a particular condition of the network but when it occurs 
as a result of an intentional attempt of an adversary, it is 
called DoS attack
• In general, ‘Denial of Service (DoS)’ is an umbrella term 
that can indicate many kinds of events in the network in 
which legitimate nodes are deprived of getting the 
expected services (intentional attempts or unintentional 
incidents)
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DoS Attack Categories
• DoS attacks can mainly be categorized into three types:
– (1) Consumption of scarce, limited, or non-renewable resources
– (2) Destruction or alteration of configuration information
– (3) Physical destruction or alteration of network resources
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Attacks Against Routing
• Attacks on Information in Transit
• Selective Forwarding
• Blachole/Sinkhole Attack
• Sybil Attack
• Wormhole Attack
• HELLO Flood Attack
• Acknowledgement Spoofing
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Information in Transit
• Routing information can be spoofed, altered during 
transmission or replayed
• Thus adversaries might be able to 
– create routing loops
– attract or repel network traffic
– extend or shorten source routes
– generate false error messages
– partition the network
– increase end-to-end latency
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Information Spoofing
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Selective Forwarding 
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Harder to detect because selectively the packets are forwarded
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Countermeasures?
• Intrusion Detection System or IDS
• Could be installed in the Base Station or Distributed IDS 
installed in each sensor node
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Blackhole/Sinkhole Attack
• Flooding Based Protocols are vulnerable
• Malicious node inserts itself between the communicating 
nodes
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Countermeasures?
• Reward based system
• Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for Sensor Networks
• This attack might enable other attacks like selective 
forwarding; hence, IDS could be the solution
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Sybil Attack
• A Node pretends to be more than one node at the same 
time
• Mostly affects geographical routing protocol
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Countermeasures?
• Difficult to deal with
• Not many works are available or efficient mechanisms 
yet to be developed
• Radio resource testing
• Random key pre-distribution
• Others mechanisms like combinations of various 
schemes
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Wormhole Attack
• Wormhole attack is a critical attack in which the attacker 
records the packets (or bits) at one location in the 
network and tunnels those to another location
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Countermeasures?
• Significant threat to Wireless Sensor Network
• It could be launched even in the neighbor discovery 
phase
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Hello Flood Attack
• HELLO packets are used for 
this attack
• By sending the HELLO packet 
the adversary tries to be 
considered as the neighbor of a 
particular node
• With incoming packets attacker 
can do anything
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Countermeasures?
• Bidirectional verification
• Multipath, multi-base routing 
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Acknowledgement Spoofing
• Some routing protocols use link layer acknowledgments
• Attacker may spoof acknowledgements
• This sort of attack convinces that weak link is strong or 
that dead node is alive
• Consequently weak link may be selected for routing; 
packets sent through that link may be lost or corrupted
• Countermeasures?
– Link layer security architecture 
– Key Management mechanisms – numerous!!!
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Approaches to Solutions
• Efficient key management schemes could provide proper 
authentication of nodes in the network
• Security for all the layers should be ensured however, 
this is an open research issue
• If sensed data could at least be sent to the base station 
using node-to-node authentication, it could deal with the 
rest
• Physical attacks cannot be prohibited without proper 
guarding mechanisms
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Approaches to Solutions
• Critical Parameters in our Research are –
– Computation Resource Utilization
– Storage Utilization
– Energy Utilization
– Level of Security ??!!
• However there should be a trade-off among these 
parameters depending on the requirements and situation 
at hand
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Approaches to Solutions
• A single mechanism cannot ensure security for all the 
levels
• Hence, there should be some sorts of co-operations 
among the various security measures applied to the 
sensors in a WSN
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Our Approach (Cont.)
• Working areas I dealt with …
– Storage-Efficient Security Schemes 
– Key Management Schemes
– Increasing the level of security especially for military networks
– Preventing Homing type DoS attacks using Key Management 
Schemes
• As in Military Networks, security is the Major issue we 
could consider a slight increase of the usage of the 
resources in the sensors
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Questions and Answers
spathan@ieee.org, spathan@bracu.ac.bd
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